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14 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: ABPO

SUBJECT: Meeting with Lord Jellicoe and Mr. Joyce,
November 12, 1949

1. Mr. Joyce called me on Saturday morning, November 12, and asked me if I could be at his office at noon for the purpose of participating in a discussion with Lord Jellicoe of the British Embassy who had telephoned him urgently for an appointment in order to discuss operation FINEB. The meeting took place in Mr. Joyce's office. The first part of the conversation dealt with the Tito-Cominform dispute, after which Lord Jellicoe raised the question of the Albanian National Committee and the successor to the late Mihal Frasheri. He expressed himself in the sense of the information which had reached us Friday evening from [] in brief: that the British did not relish the prospect of Hassan Dosti as Chairman of the Committee and strongly favored the election of Abas Kupi.

2. I outlined to Lord Jellicoe our views in this matter at some length. I said to him that our concern in connection with the formation of the Albanian National Committee over a long period last spring was not particularly inspiring or pleasant. We had, therefore, resolved, when Frasheri died, that we were not going to get involved in a head-beating, gold-piece haggling, character assassination role in connection with the election of a successor to Frasheri and had decided that the Albanians themselves should select their candidate without outside interference. We were advised of the selection of Hassan Dosti as the head of Balli Kombetar and although our information came from a reliable source, we had deferred to the British suggestion that this fact be carefully checked. We had further deferred to the British suggestion that Dosti's departure for Italy in order to confer with his colleagues in Balli Kombetar should be delayed for a period of two weeks. Dosti was actually delayed more than two weeks. Since his arrival in Rome, he appeared to be the most serious candidate for the Chairmanship of the Committee, and we could see no harm if he is finally elected to this position. We had specifically instructed our representative in Rome not to interfere in connection with discussions going on for the election of Frasheri's successor and this remained his instruction.

3. I said to Lord Jellicoe that I appreciated the British

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SECRET

- 2 -

relationship and position vis-a-vis Abas Kupi and would have no objection to Abas Kupi as the head of the Albanian National Committee. I did not, however, think it was necessary or desirable to antagonize a lot of people or to stir up a battle over this matter. If the Albanians themselves could agree on their Chairman, so much the better. If Dosti is selected, we should support him fully; if Kupi should be elected, the same would hold for him; if Andoni or somebody else should be elected, it would be all right with us. But I did want to make it clear to him that we did not intend to interfere in any way with the current negotiations in connection with the election of a Chairman for the Albanian National Committee. If, however, the Albanians should be unable to agree upon a Chairman, then it might be appropriate for us to reconsider our position and agree to re-enter the picture in an advisory role.

4. Lord Jellicoe asked if we had heard anything as to a possible change in Said Kryeziu's position vis-a-vis Dosti, and then stated that he thought our position was reasonable and said that he would inform London of it.

C. OFFICE

cc: GOP ✓
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